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POPULATION POLICY: IS IT A QUESTION 
OF VOLUNTARISM OR COERCION? 
By W. Murray Todd" 
One of America's well-known demographers is fond of riveting 
the attention of his audiences by announcing that the only al-
ternatives to fertility limitation are infanticide, cannibalism, and 
homosexuality.l In this spirit it was tempting to entitle this es-
say "The Federal Coitus Interruptus Act of 1984," following in 
the footsteps of the authors who use such titles as "The Popula-
tion Bomb" (Paul Erlich); "The Case for Compulsory Birth 
Control" (Edgar R. Chasteen); "Nobody Ever Dies of Over-
population" (Garrett Hardin); "Famine 1975" (The Paddock 
Brothers) and "Everybody's Guilty-The Ecological Dilemma" 
(Garrett Hardin). 
Only a very few J?eople still think the world can roll along at 
the rate of populatIOn growth it now sustains. The rest of us 
recognize the need for some sort of limitation on the present 
growth pattern, and vast numbers of us are seeking ways to cut 
that growth rate. Therefore, it is not just academic to ask whether 
the majority of population-conscious people operate from a sound 
philosophic base when they advocate voluntary family planning 
as a solution. All of the authors just mentioned say they do not. 
These authors say in various ways and with slightly differing 
shades of emphasis that some sort of compulsory regulation of 
fertility is necessary to curb the rate of population growth. Some 
would try to turn back the population clock to some optimum 
"steady state" population and others would settle for an im-
mediate goal of "zero population growth," but there are few 
significant philosophical differences between these two positions. 
At the outset, let me stipulate that in discussing the nature of 
this argument about voluntarism (sometimes inaccurately de-
scribed as "only family planning") and compulsory birth control 
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(also known as coercion), I am not taking a position on, or dis-
cussing, compulsory sterilization to reduce the transmission of 
genetic defects and problems of like genre. I am addressing the 
question of whether physically and mentally sound people should 
be enjoined by the community to limit their offspring, under 
threat of some sort of state-imposed penalty if they do not 
comply? 
When we talk about "voluntarism," we are talking about an 
approach to fertility limitation that permits people to have con-
trol over the number and spacing of their children and freedom 
of choice. It is important to note that "freedom of choice" in-
cludes the freedom not to have children; it does not, as so often 
stated, mean simply the freedom to have as many children as a 
couple can conceive or support. 
THE COMPULSORY BIRTH CONTROL ARGUMENT 
The argument for compulsory birth control has a rather well-
established pattern. It is beginning to take on a literary style that 
puts it in the same category as the "who-dun-it?" or the classic 
western. First there is a wealth of statistical material showing 
where we were, where we are now, and then the absolutely ap-
palling prediction of where we are going if present birth rates 
continue to some date in the future when we either cannot feed 
or otherwise sustain the numbers of people projected. There is no 
point in arguing with this statistical material. It is as correct as 
demographic studies and mathematical extrapolation can make it. 
The prospect is genuinely frightening, and it is usually told with-
out embellishment because it needs none. 
In the early days of this literary genre the figures about num-
bers of people were matched against tons of grain and other food 
production indices and there was an obvious mismatch of signifi-
cant proportions. Since the "Green Revolution," the predictions 
about food and people have been tempered by the almost un-
believable turnaround in agricultural productivity. It now ap-
pears to many experts that there may be enough food for some 
time to come; in fact, perhaps enough to take the world to the 
point of population stability assuming that point can be reached 
within the next 75-100 years. I should also like to submit that 
the Green Revolution has, to some observers, demonstrated that 
relying on simple extrapolation of numbers into the future is 
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frought with peril when it is possible for human institutions 
deliberately to intervene. 
This literature then exposes the reader to the horrors of en vi-
ronmen tal commission and omission we have perpetrated on our 
planet (usually known as "spaceship earth"). Frequently this 
material is anecdotal, with heart-rending glimpses of the author 
trying valiantly to find his tiny spot of unblemished nature, only 
to discover a rusty beer can or a nonbiodegradable plastic con-
tainer smack-dab in the middle of his sylvan glade. This aspect 
of the literature has a rather extraordinary pull for the sensitive 
reader because he finds himself nodding and saying "isn't that 
true" while recalling some similar incident that has happened to 
him. It also gives the reader the sense that he and the author 
share comparable values, when in truth this may be very far 
from the fact. 
The "population-environment" argument frequently tends to 
confuse the number of people with their level of consumption. It 
almost invariably is filled with dire predictions about the rate of 
utilization of nonrenewable resources and the developed world's 
exploitation of natural resources from the developing world. It 
usually fails to note the variety of very densely populated places 
and the vast differences in the environmental problems they ex-
perience. Compare, for example, The Netherlands and the Nile 
Delta. The argument almost always fails to offer alternatives to 
the exploitation of natural resources as a way for developing 
nations to earn desperately needed hard currency. Rarely is it 
pointed out that substitution of nonrenewable resources (if there 
really are such things) is possible through product substitution, 
the development of alternatives, and synthetic raw materials. 
When these authors note that, by definition, "nonrenewable 
resources" have to run out some time in the future no matter 
what the population may be, the explicit or implicit argument is 
that the human race should, ipso facto, put off its destiny for as 
long as possible. There is no recognition that it may be wise to 
deliberately choose to preserve certain values at the expense of 
certain resources. For example, we currently have the capacity 
to derive much of our energy needs from nuclear power, yet we 
still use petroleum products for this purpose. The economics of 
power provide one set of values while the alternative uses of 
petroleum (pharmaceuticals, proteins and petrochemical prod-
ucts) provide another. These economic and social "trade-offs"-
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in the terms of the economist-have not been fully illuminated 
for the public. 
There are compelling arguments about the quality of life and 
the effects of overcrowding. It is not unusual to find Desmond 
Morris, Robert Ardey, Konrad Lorenz, John B. Calhoun, and 
other ethologists and investigators of animal behavior quoted to 
demonstrate what either has happened or can happen to people 
when they are packed too closely together or their "natural" 
proclivities are thwarted. In most cases this is a disservice to the 
author quoted, because, on the whole, students of animal be-
havior are reasonably careful about reporting their findings, and 
they distinguish between their often fascinating speculations as 
to how these findings may apply to human behavior and the 
results of their experimentation and observation. 
The case for compulsory birth control to enhance the "quality 
of life" is one of the most pernicious and insidious arguments used 
in the literature of coercion. These authors regularly apply their 
yardsticks of the quality of life with few, if any, references to the 
myriad approaches to this complex of values as they are mani-
fested among the varied cultures, religious backgrounds and 
national and ethical points of view that abound in the world. The 
quality of life to be maintained, or achieved, is usually a purely 
personal, ethnocentric vision held by the author. 
These books and articles usually also describe the limitations 
of family planning programs and harken back to Kingsley Davis's 
1967 article in Science2 which was one of the first close examina-
tions of the argument for compulsion. It may be useful to note 
that we have come a long way since 1967, as the recently released 
figures on U.S. population show. This is not to say that family 
planning caused the drop in the U.S. fertility rate from 3.8 in 
1957 to less than 2.5 in 1970,3 but it is hard to deny that providing 
contraceptives, making sterilization and abortion legal and ac-
cessible, and significantly changed attitudes have been a con-
tributing factor. 
To digress momentarily let us look at the results of the New 
York abortion laws in the brief period since legal abortions have 
become freely available. 
This data is instructive in many ways. It is said, for example, 
that a particularly liberal law was brought before the New York 
Legislature with the expectation that its very looseness would 
ensure its rejection. Once the law was passed, it was predicted 
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that the effect would be to so overburden the medical facilities 
that other patients would suffer from neglect or that the results 
of the program would be to create a situation even less desirable 
than the one that existed (the prevalence of illegal abortions). 
The net effect, interestingly enough, has been spectacularly posi-
tive in almost all ways: the poor have been served at no cost, if 
necessary; the rate of "incomplete abortions" has dropped (i.e. 
the cases of illegal abortions that require subsequent hospital 
care); maternal and infant mortality and illegitimacy have de-
clined; and there is clear evidence that women from all socio-
economic strata will avail themselves of this service.' 
It is tempting, but obviously premature, to hope this evidence 
bears out the contention of the voluntarists that given the means, 
the knowledge, and the will, people will indeed take the steps 
needed to markedly reduce the rate of population growth. Specu-
late for a moment on what might happen if, as is quite probable, 
a simple, cheap, abortifacient (morning-after pill) is developed 
and made easily accessible to the women of the developing world! 
If one agrees that making it easy for people not to have babies 
is a good idea, it is extremely difficult not to accept the"program 
of the family planning camp. A little later I will try to point out 
some of the obstacles the advocates of voluntary family planning 
have yet to overcome and leave it to the reader to speculate on 
how the advocates of compulsion would go about things differ-
ently. 
The literary scenario of compulsory birth control usually 
includes examples of other ways governments compel social be-
havior and coerce individuals. Sometimes there is a pseudo-legal 
set of arguments about the differences between rights and privi-
leges and the conclusion is drawn that as between the rights of 
the individual and the rights of society, those of society must 
prevail if civilization as we know it is to continue. This very 
genuine question has engaged the attention of philosophers for 
centuries. Today the question is acute because it relates to a wide 
array of seemingly intractable political and economic problems 
with profound ethical overtones. In stark contrast to contem-
porary political and ethical thinkers, the compulsion-oriented 
group settles the matter with a speed and facility that is truly 
astonishing and goes on to its "final solution" which inevitably 
reduces individual freedom. 
The legal arguments of the compulsory birth controllers are 
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curiously devoid of reference to the actual problems of changing 
existing legislation to make contraception, sterilization, and 
abortion so freely available that the populace could conform. 
This is not an insignificant point, but it IS usually glossed over 
with a sweeping legal formula that is designed to take rrecedence 
over all existing laws relating to the provision of sexua education 
and practice, information about contraception, the medical pro-
tocols surrounding sterilization and abortion, and the provision 
of public funds and resources for these purposes. Luke Lee, writ-
ing for a World Health Organization group has summarized the 
difficulties faced by many countries in bringing their legal appa-
ratus into conjunction with the 1968 Teheran U.N. Proclamation 
that family planning is a basic human right. 6 
Lee notes that rights imply a legal as well as moral obligation 
on the states that uphold them; the legal systems of many coun-
tries are woefully inadequate to the task of making this a working 
principle of political life upon which people can rely. 
This is a fascinating problem and one with which it is impos-
sible to more than touch upon here, but for those who are seri-
ously interested in doing something about the population prob-
lem, it might be instructive to examine with some care the legal 
impediments to the full exercise of this right in their immediate 
jurisdiction. The impact of administrative regulation should not 
be ignored in such a search. In the United States a marvelous 
example of this paradox is the current state of contraceptive 
research as it is regulated by the Food and Drug Administration. 
Carl Djerassi has pointed out that under today's rules it would 
take approximately 17t years and 18 million dollars from start 
to finish to produce, test, and have accepted a new abortifacient 
agent in the United States.6 As it now stands, in this country we 
rely on the private drug manufacturers to undertake this research 
and reward them by permitting them to recoup the costs from 
the profits made on the sales of their products. His point is simple. 
The time and the investment required, the chance of failure and 
the prognosis that over the life-span of the project the rules will 
again change, make the risk most unattractive. Who then will 
conduct thIS research and undertake the testing? Do we rely on a 
state institution to do this, and, if so, have we set a precedent for 
the research, testing, and evaluation of other pharmaceutical 
products with inherent patient risk? 
In India, which has long been attempting to cope with its 
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population problems, it was only in August 1971 that legislation 
was passed providing for legal abortions 
... where the continuance of the pregnancy would involve a risk to 
the life of the pregnant woman or of grave injury to her physical or 
mental health ... 
and in explanation, 
Where any pregnancy occurs as a result of failure of any device or 
method used by any married women or her husband for the purpose 
of limiting the number of children; the anguish caused by such un-
wanted pregnancy may be presumed to constitute a grave injury to 
the mental health of the pregnant woman.7 
This legislation appears to omit the unmarried woman, but sets 
an interesting and useful precedent for the determination of 
" .. " grave Injury. 
Back to the literature of compulsory birth control: having set 
the stage for compulsion and marshalled their arguments, the 
usual prescription of the compulsory birth controllers first insists 
that contraceptive information and materials, voluntary steriliza-
tion and abortion be made completely accessible to everyone of 
reproductive age. This, of course, is the platform of the volun-
tarists as well. Next, the advocates of compulsion suggest that 
there must be a national zero-population-growth goal, and some 
legislative basis for this is offered. Finally, they argue that since 
population is an issue that cannot be well regulated under strictly 
construed legal devices, it is necessary to draft legislation in terms 
of broad policy and leave the implementation of these laws to 
executive agencies that would be given wide latitude in creating 
their own administrative law to enforce. Most, if not all, of the 
authors prescribing this path immediately disclaim any personal 
liking for coercion or administrative law, but profess to see no 
alternative for "survival." 
There are often ancillary policy dicta attached to this scenario 
-for example, it is frequently argued that the United States first 
demonstrate to the rest of the world its willingness to abandon 
this aspect of personal freedom before it demands it of others, but 
then it follows with the statement that we must not furnish 
bilateral aid (sometimes specified to include food assistance) to 
any country that will not take the same draconian steps. 
The authors of plans for compulsory birth control are uni-
formly secretive about revealing their methods of enforcing the 
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laws they advocate. Paul Erlich has predicted "criminal prose-
cution" of those who have more than two children, but neither 
he nor his literary colleagues offer workable notions of what the 
penalties for "overbreeding" would be, upon whom they would 
be imposed, or even how the state determines who has how many 
children. 8 (It might not be too easy, considering the freedom with 
which we change partners.) 
Either explicitly or implicitly the arguments presented by the 
people advocating compulsory birth control appear to be based 
on the following perceptions and assumptions: 
-That there are too many people in the world already; 
-That because these people cannot be counted upon to understand 
their own best interests, somebody has to tell them what those inter-
ests are; 
-That society has an overriding right to control the most intimate ele-
ments of the lives of individuals; and 
-That this right of society is assumed because "survival" is the para-
mount goal of mankind. 
The reader will have to decide whether there is merit to any or 
all of these assumptions and perceptions. In my view they are 
misapplied to the problems of population growth. 
The literature on compulsory birth control tells us a lot about 
the people who write it and their views of the society in which 
they live. 
A REPLY TO THE ARGUMENT 
The inherent weaknesses of this literature, aside from occa-
sional factual distortions, appear to me to stem from a curious 
blindness about existing human values as compared to the as-
sumed values Garrett Hardin ascribes to the tragic people who 
populate his commons. 9 I have great difficulty in accepting the 
validity of his assumption that the only appeal to parents to limit 
their offspring is through conscience. Doubtless this is one impor-
tant appeal, but it appears to be a remarkable oversimplification 
to build the case for compulsion by ignoring the powerful positive 
forces at work which motivate people to have a limited number 
of children. He says, "Unfortunately, logic and experience show 
that continuing to support the right to breed is suicidal."lo Some 
forms of logic may indeed lead to this conclusion, but he presents 
no evidence that experience bears out this contention. 
Historical demography has established that over time and in 
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many places, people have limited their populations voluntarily, 
and are still doing so in some cases (notably France and other 
parts of Western Europe). The appeal of the small family from 
an economic standpoint, for maternal and child health reasons, 
because of a shortage of housing or other logistic factors, simply 
cannot be ignored. 
This brings me to a pair of related concerns about this litera-
ture: The scientists who have written about compulsory birth 
control are eminent men in their fields-which are not the disci-
plines of national policy makers. They reveal their ideas lucidly 
and base them on selected scientific data; simultaneously they 
offer their speculative and prescriptive opinions in precisely the 
same tone of voice and with identical authority. Although their 
public airing of the population problem indeed is an important 
service to the community, their technique can overwhelm the 
findings of more sober scholars, may amuse politicians while de-
flecting their attention from the real issues, and most assuredly 
frighten a gullible public or galvanize portions of it into faddish 
actions that are useless and shortlived. 
To be sure, the advocates of family planning also can, and 
have, overstated their case thereby generating a significant reac-
tion from groups that offer radical solutions. For example, the 
New York Times carried a series of full-page advertisements in 
1968-69 by the "Campaign to Check the Population Explosion." 
These ads, carrying the names of many prominent family plan-
ning advocates, were remarkable examples of the propagandists' 
craft. What appeared to many readers to be deliberately mis-
leading innuendoes were coupled with an hysterical tone and a 
plea for funds that combined to cause acute anguish within the 
small, but dedicated, fraternity of people who have devoted their 
lives and careers to prudent and well-designed programs of family 
planning. These ads are now cited as evidence of establishment 
degeneracy by advocates of social revolution who say: "To sum 
up, it appears that population control is a program developed by, 
and to serve the interests of, the u.S. ruling class. All the humani-
tarian rhetoric in the world cannot mask the fact that the exploi-
tation can continue."ll 
Other critics of population control, fertility limitation, and 
family planning cite the obvious fact that it is the white well-to-
do, educated, powerful elite that provides the funds and the 
propaganda to control the births of the black, brown, yellow, 
poor, uneducated, and weak. Whether these accusations have 
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merit is important, but even more important is that those who 
make them have indeed put their accusatory finger on a very real 
weakness in some family planning programs and have pinpointed 
a weakness in the arguments offered by most of the advocates of 
compulsory birth control; they have identified the issue of social 
justice. An articulate approach to this problem was offered the 
President's Commission on Population Growth and the American 
Future by Dr. Charles V. Willie, a black sociologist, who pointed 
out that, "A national population policy must demonstrate that 
it is more concerned about the health and wealth of black people 
than it is about the number of children they have. I am talking 
about a positive population policy which is the preferred way to 
deal with a negative effect."12 
This statement about the black community in the United 
States may just be a capsule summary of the philosophy of the 
underprivileged anywhere on the face of the earth. Newspaper 
reports in the fall of 1971 provided ample evidence of the growing 
intensity of official feeling in less developed countries that "in-
definite coexistence between poverty and affluence is no longer 
possible."13 Barbara Ward Jackson has denounced the "obses-
sion" of the affluent white community with birth control as the 
solution to the world's problems of hunger and poverty. In a 
pungent phrase this eminent Catholic laywoman declared, "If a 
man asks you for bread and you offer him a pill, he'll spit in your 
eye."14 Paul Erlich, in his recent book How To Be A Survivor, has 
come to grips with an interesting aspect of the social justice ques-
tion. In constructing an ethic of survival he has opted for a re-
distribution of wealth based on a lowered level of consumption 
by the affluent To me this is backing into the issue, and freedom 
is not a part of his ethic-nonetheless it is a step beyond the rest 
of the advocates of compulsion 
A con tra-li tera ture is now being wri tten-and read-and it 
may be epitomized by Richard Neuhaus, a Brooklyn minister 
who is challenging the "ecology movement" to straighten out its 
priorities, noting that, "the goal is not survival, but survival as 
human beings." He notes that, "the important questions are 
political and moral."15 
THE POLITICAL DIMENSION 
Population policy is a political matter. One critical dimension 
of the problem is that only women can bear children, so popula-
tion policy must inevitably be directly related to women. It is 
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estimated that there are roughly 795,626,000 women in the 
fertile age group (15-44) in the world today.16 They live in over 
144 nations with thousands of local jurisdictions. They speak 154 
major languages (defined as having over 1 million speakers) and 
an incredible number of minor languages and dialects. As of 1957, 
UNESCO estimated that there were 690-720 million adult il-
literates in the world, and one could assume at least half were 
women. (Actually the number of women was probably far more 
than half because of the unequal educational opportunities for 
women in so many underprivileged parts of the earth.) 
Wha t are we asking these women to do? We are asking them 
to so regulate their lives that they bear only two children (one 
out of three can bear one more) between the time they first men-
struate and the time of the onset of the menopause, roughly a 30 
year period with a rate of "exposure" to impregnation that is 
dependent entirely on the woman's sexual activity. 
Tha t is some task. 
My point is obvious. Trying to devise and enforce laws that 
will accomplish these ends, if not impossible, would entail such a 
diversion of real and psychic resources, energy, talent, and man-
power that it staggers the imagination. In my view it would 
doubtless also be so controversial that great harm might result 
for all fertility-limiting endeavors. The fundamental question is 
whether there is any evidence that preparing and implementing 
coercive measures now would affect the course of world popula-
tion growth faster or more effectively than doing all the other 
things we can do to reduce that growth through acceptable exist-
ing measures? Or, put in a different frame of reference, a more 
appealing goal is to extend the freedom not to have children. 
Two futures loom. The "Club of Rome" through a series of 
studies commissioned at the Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
nology under the leadership of Jay Forrester and Dennis Mea-
dows has a model of the world which, in essence, sets the maxi-
mum sustainable world population at something less than 14 
billion within the next 100 years. This means, say these prognos-
ticators, that because of a doubling time of 32 years, the current 
rate of growth must drop precipitously before year 2030, or enor-
mous social disruptions can be expected. In making these judg-
ments from their computer-assisted mode, Messrs. Forrester and 
Meadows have brought into play another analytical tool to 
buttress the arguments of both the voluntarists and the coercive 
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controllers. They have set two boundaries-the total number of 
people and a time scale. In theory at least, we now have some 
sort of a yardstick against which to measure the need for any 
given set of policies or actions and one by which we can assess 
their success. Whether you like the yardstick or the way it was 
constructed (and many critics find it somewhat elastic) it is a 
challenging intellectual approach to the problem. 
A more optimistic Roger Revelle, Director of the Harvard 
Center for Population Studies, predicts that, " ... the earth's 
human population could level off at less than 10 thousand million 
people by the latter half of the 21st century."17 This again gives 
us some grasp of the dimensions of the problem and some capacity 
to face its political and moral implications for policy makers and 
for paren ts. 
THE MAKING OF POPULATION POLICY 
As every reader recognizes, the global dimensions of the popu-
lation problem are not those faced by the individual policy maker 
in any given country. However, there are common threads to 
population policy, no matter where the policy is made (the issue 
is women and children). There are also global trends that cannot 
be ignored locally (the quest for social justice), tides of opinion 
that cut across national boundaries (the multilateral vs. bilateral 
technical assistance controversy), natural or contrived enthusi-
asms-fads-that sweep people up and then deposit them some-
place they did not expect to be (the initial enthusiasm for the 
Intra-Uterine Device), and the grim reminder that it is impera-
tive that something be done. This last, in my view, is a singularly 
important fact of political life; it stimulates action but carries the 
risk that it can be the wrong action or the wrong time for it. It 
may also be pertinent to note that people engaged in this task 
will tend to seek and use the data and experience developed else-
where. They do not have to reinvent the wheel. 
Now if the reader will put himself in the position of the cabinet-
minister-in-the-street of a developing country for a few moments, 
it may be instructive to see how these complex and occasionally 
con trary forces bear on policy making and poli tical decisions. Let 
us assume there exists a robust will to "get this population prob-
lem under control" and that steps are to be taken. Harken back 
to a prescription offered by Bernard Berelson some years ago 
when he offered six criteria for any operational fertility control 
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programs: "(i) scientific, medical, and technological readiness; 
(ii) political viability; (iii) administrative feasibility; (iv) eco-
nomic capability; (v) moral, ethical, and philosophical accepta-
bility; and (vi) presumed effectiveness."18 Couple this checklist 
to the critical variables of population matters: age, sex, and 
spatial distribution patterns. These are the initial elements of a 
very rough political decision-making matrix. It is manifest im-
mediately that Barry Commoner's ecological principle that "we 
can never merely do one thing," is a precept working politicians 
know instinctively. 
Rationally conceived population policies require a strong 
strategic base and tactical flexibility. They can be "counter-
productive" unless due consideration is given to as many of the 
secondary effects as the fertile imagination can conjure up. They 
should be adaptable in the light of changing circumstances and 
the development of new knowledge and take into account techni-
cal constraints, our current state of knowledge, and what we 
perceive to be our priority needs. 
Regrettably much of the literature on population policy has 
been based on a static view of the situation. Many of us have 
failed to note peoples' changing demographic behavior and the 
changing state of knowledge. But while students of population 
policy take the time to organize their thoughts and amass data, 
it is quite impractical for leaders to wait to do something, for 
then they cease to lead. One result of this gap is that some less-
than-stateman-like leaders transform the problem into a devil 
("I will not go against God's law," or "It is a capitalist-imperialist 
~rick," or "This is genocide.") which is one way to evade the 
Issue. 
Within the matrix offered above it is possible for those who 
take their responsibilities in a more pragmatic light to envision a 
rough approximation of the characteristics of workable popula-
tion policies. Based on the strategic desirability of the small 
family norm-i.e., replacement level at some point in the future 
-such a policy should be contrived to enhance maternal and 
child health, facilitate socially and economically useful education 
for both young and old, help balance the population with respect 
to age and sex and spatial distribution, provide for social justice 
through adequate employment and social security, permit sexual 
and other purely individual freedoms and pleasures, and meet the 
ethical needs and goals of the cuI ture. 
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The population policy maker will perceive that, taken in this 
context, the problem becomes one of creating a series of public 
goals, only one of which will be fertility limitation. The institu-
tional support required to make these goals workable far trans-
cends the agencies of the state as such, but governmentally sup-
ported institutions, the schools and health and welfare organiza-
tions, will most assuredly figure prominently in the actual opera-
tional aspects of most population policies. It is hard to see how 
population policies will work without the underpinning of a 
private climate of opinion and a set of attitudes (through the 
churches, unions, co-ops, cultural media, and so on) which will 
run parallel to actual state-supported programs. 
Seen in this light it is reasonable to assert that the checking of 
rapid population growth will result from a galaxy of positive 
measures and incentives motivating parents to have fewer chil-
dren than they do now for reasons they perceive to be of substan-
tial advantage to themselves and to the children they produce. 
This will be a voluntary process in the very real sense that the 
institutions of society will present evidence of these advantages 
to parents, and they will act in accord with that evidence. It will 
not be coercive in either the legal sense or in the context of de-
liberate deception or contrived incentives that subvert the value 
systems of those affected. 
Population policies can be divided into two general categories. 
The first category encompasses those policies that are population-
responsive (i.e., that are created as a result of the numbers of 
people, their age, or sex balance, or their spatial distribution). 
The second category encompasses those policies that are popu-
lation-influencing (i.e., those that actually affect the rate of 
population growth or the distribution of people, the balance of 
their ages, sexes, or their demographic behavior).l9 
Here, in very short compass, are some of the population-
responsive policies that result from high fertility rates and conse-
quent rapid population growth: 
-The numbers of doctors, nurses, midwives, and other providers of 
health services and the numbers of teachers and educational ad-
ministrators must expand more rapidly than the number of people 
for whom they care and educate, otherwise the existing level of per 
capita health service and education will, in all likelihood, drop. 
-The new and conventional agricultural technology must be so 
utilized that the rate of growth of agricultural production exceeds 
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the rate of population growth and the nutritional quality of 
peoples' diets continues to improve. In other words, it will not be 
enough merely to increase the rate of food production quantita-
tively; this increase must be qualitative as well. While improve-
ment in the use of agricultural technology takes place, policies 
must be contrived to absorb the ever-increasing numbers of mar-
ginal farmers (who cannot use the new technology effectively) into 
productive employment either in service or industrial occupations. 
-The problems of urbanization (which hardly need be detailed here) 
are accentuated in developing countries by the push off the land 
and the pull of the city. Without labor-intensive (vs. capital inten-
sive) industrialization and a vast expansion of service occupations 
in these countries, the problems of unemployment and underem-
ployment can become the nightmare of the 21st century. Thus, the 
policies contrived for economic development are, by definition, 
essentially population-responsive policies particularly in develop-
ing countries. 
-In countries with heterogenous populations, effective population 
policies will stress social justice and equity among different racial, 
religious, tribal, ethnic, and cultural groups, or these groups may 
perceive such policies as a direct threat to their existence as groups. 
This is particularly important in those countries where legislative 
representation is based on effective popular voting and the pres-
ence of two or more groups in perceived conflict puts an apparent 
premium on the numbers of voters and hence, may affect attitudes 
toward limiting population. 
Population-injluencing policies designed to reduce population 
growth and alter fertili ty patterns can be viewed by the policy 
maker as directly applicable to the problems of economic develop-
ment and social improvement. If they are not so viewed, their 
context becomes essentially negative. Here are some examples of 
such policies: 
-The reduction of infant and maternal mortality are necessary. In 
fact, it is very likely that the reduction of infant mortality is a 
necessary precondition to the reduction of fertility because families 
will continue to have babies unless they are reasonably sure those 
they already have stand a strong chance of surviving to adult-
hood.20 
-Governments and private institutions must improve the accessibil-
ity to, and reduce the cost of, fertility-limiting materials and ser-
vices and educate parents (really everyone of reproductive age) in 
their acceptability and use. In a sense this is the beginning of wis-
dom in any serious population program that seeks to limit fertility, 
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but it is not at all an easy task because it requires the application 
of very substantial resources over a long period at a sustained rate. 
-The case for the small-family norm must be advanced by educating 
parents to the advantages of the small family. There is ample evi-
dence from both developed and developing countries that the 
children from small, well-spaced families "do better" in terms of 
health, education, and economic status than their counterparts from 
large families-no matter what the income level of the parents. 
Equally compelling evidence is being accumulated that the small 
family "does better" than the large family under similar circum-
stances. This statement is so sweeping in its inclusiveness that I 
can only refer the reader to the current literature-which ad-
mittedly is spotty-for confirmation, but the National Academy 
of Sciences study, Rapid Population Growth21 presents a substantial 
body of the evidence that supports this contention. 
-Provide for the health and the status of women by concentrating 
on maternal and child health care and by offering women equal 
educational and employment opportunities. It' is intriguing to 
worry along with the population policy maker in the cost-benefit 
analysis of the increased employment of women. On the one hand, 
the immediate expansion of the labor force may well increase the 
rate of unemployment and underemployment. On the other hand, 
the incentives to women not to have children may, over a genera-
tion or so, materially reduce the number of children born and there-
fore reduce the work force. 
The reader will doubtless realize that the implicit choices in all 
of the positive policy suggestions made above would have to be 
coped with, whether one opts for compulsory or voluntary fertil-
ity limitation. Voluntarism requires positive motivation and the 
will to take the necessary time and effort to educate parents. It 
is costly in these terms, but at least it has two obvious benefits: 
(1) it does not generate a raging argument about people's rights 
and freedoms with all the costs that would entail, and (2) it builds 
on a growing body of institutional expertise that can, and is, 
adjusting to such changing manifestations of the global social 
will as the expanding demands for social justice and the concern 
for the natural and human environment. 
CONCLUSION 
Arguing the case for compulsory birth control, using the prem-
ise that people will have as many children as they can, is a little 
like saying that our society is faced with a moral breakdown be-
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cause of the prevalence of sexual promiscuity as it is measured by 
soaring rates of illegitimacy and venereal disease. Obviously in-
creased illegitimacy and venereal disease may be the result of 
moral turpitude. It may also be that we have suddenly become 
more aware of these problems because of accentuated publicity, 
modifications in sexual habits, or a greater freedom in revealing 
them because of fundamental changes in society. There is, as far 
as I know, little or no evidence that a reduced level of sexual 
education, restricted availability of contraceptive information 
and devices, or refusal of legal abortions would improve "moral-
ity." Very few indeed really want an illegitimate child and no-
body wants VD. It may also be that there is not too much interest 
in being moral-as that term may be defined by its public 
guardians-thus, it is useful, in conclusion, to take a very brief 
look at our original question. Is voluntarism an effective philoso-
phy with which to tackle the world population problem? There 
is no conclusive evidence to answer that question either way, but 
there is strong presumptive evidence suggesting that policy 
makers have to capitalize upon people's propensity to do what 
they wish and guide-not force-those wishes. 
Last year two French Cabinet Ministers (Defense, and Labor 
Employment and Population) spoke out about the "under-
population" of France. The situation was attributed by one of 
them to a psychological climate of insecurity, the propensity of 
young Frenchmen to have fatal automobile accidents, and of 
their seniors to become alcoholics. Are the Cabinet Ministers 
correct in assessing the French problem as "underpopulation," 
or is the public telling the Government something about French 
society that happens to manifest itself in the population growth 
rate? At a population conference in Strasbourg last year it was 
reported that the populations of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, Denmark, France, Sweden, and Portugal are not growing 
at the replacement rate; and the net effect will be an aging and 
therefore "less dynamic" population. The fact that it will be an 
aging population is doubtless true, but the evidence for the ab-
sence of dynamism-however that is measured-is far less con-
clusive. In 1969 Japan's Prime Minister advocated an increase 
in the Japanese birthrate despite the fact that Japan is made up 
of the most crowded and densely populated islands in the world. 
In this instance the recommendation was made with an eye to an 
increasingly serious labor shortage and again with respect to the 
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aging population and to the burden it creates for the working frac-
tion of the population. 
Somehow I find it difficult to imagine the French Cabinet 
Ministers having much success in curbing the propensity of young 
Frenchmen to drive with Gallic insouciance, or weaning the older 
Frenchman from his aperitif. It also seems unlikely that the 
Japanese Prime Minister will convince Japanese parents that 
more little productive units is just what they want. 
How paradoxical that in most developing countries of the world 
there is an enormous surplus of labor and in some of the most 
developed there is a shortage (leaving aside the differences in 
skills for the moment); in most of the developing countries of the 
world there is an economic burden based on a preponderance of 
nonproductive youth (in some of these countries 45 percent of the 
population is 15 and under) while some of the highly developed 
countries are worried about the costs of supporting the aged. 
This sort of essay does not permit the drawing of precise con-
clusions; however, perhaps it is worth noting my own hypothesis 
about the future. It is based on the assumption that in the great 
sweep of history people have made some horrendous mistakes as 
individuals and societies, but that we are here today because, on 
balance, they managed to make the choices that were in their own 
best interests. If this be so, it seems that the philosophy of helping 
each other to learn what is in our own best interest and extending 
the freedom to choose is supported by the weight of human ex-
perience and preference. Just as jails are inefficient places to 
teach good citizenship, so coercive and compulsory legislation is 
inefficien t from both the economic and social viewpoint. There 
are vast arrays of things to do to make it easy and acceptable for 
people to limit their fertility. Doing these things-a few of which 
have been suggested in this essay-seems to be the natural order 
of business for the concerned . 
.. + ____ >.oo( ___ .... ~ 
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